Could the all powerful Pakistan army afford to keep Bhutto alive, especially with his track record of having taken down two military dictators one of which was a self proclaimed Field Marshal? This one sentence is enough to sum up poor Bhutto's miserable plight as he was held in almost complete isolation in Rawalpindi jail. On paper it was a classical match-up, a super charismatic Bhutto pited against an all time charismatic General Zia ul-Haq. On the other hand one had the backing of people while the other of the powerful military establishment. In the end it was Bhutto's hauteur and pride which proved to be his downfall. His fiery threats to set the Generals right when back in power gave the military generals shivers, which forced them to counter attack. Bhutto as a politician should have seen it coming. If the generals were powerful enough to take down his government they could take him down as well. A lesser confident leader would have followed a mild appeasement policy instead of going all guns blazing, but Bhutto was on a roll.
Zia was appointed by Bhutto as chairman of a committee to investigate the first attempt by the army in 1973 against him. It is ironic that whatever lessons Zia learnt he was successfully able to turn them around in his own orchestrated coup in 1977.
Reading Bhutto's rebuttal to Zia's white paper, I could feel argumentation of a skills lawyer setting out his own case while sitting in a death cell. He rants and races occasionally but that has to be attributed to some of the points raised in the Junta's White paper I guess. Bhutto has made a fantastic case against his allegations but I could not help wonder why let himself into this dire state to start with? Bhutto was supposed to be the master politician to start with, he knew well how power worked in Pakistan. After all he was himself a chief marital law administrator himself, albeit a civilian one. He should have remained calm and trusted his people to deliver instead of aping his uniformed predecessors in letter and voice. His answer to the White paper makes depressing reading as somehow he knew that his game was up. His only hope seems to be the USA and it's Arab cronies who were not able to save him in the end. I think USA had chosen to make an example of him for all of his earlier transgressions. Maybe he opened up too many frontiers at the same time?
The way power shifts from one to another at the top (in Pakistan) has always managed to be a great mystery for me. It's almost like a sixth sense, lost when constrained by following law. People just seem to know when halo shifts from one person to another in the land of the pure. How did Ayub know when to topple Iskander Mirza for instance? How did Yehya take over from Ayub? And finally how was Bhutto able to drive into Yehya's presidency only to drive out with the presidents flag flying on his car instead? This is a fascinating area of study examples of which can only be found in history books. What goes around comes around, and Bhutto should have realised that the same mysterious spectre of power grab would come and hound him one day as well. In other words he should have done a Zardari. For Zardari has to be given greater credit for finding a way to relinquish power peacefully, on time, at the right moment to the next government, which is an unprecedented event in the whole history of the country. Thus Zardari stays untouched and unmolested siting contently in his villas and drinking fine wine.
In Bhutto's rebuttal, he makes very convincing and points out many inconsistencies in the Junta's white paper over and over again but it all comes down to naught. It felt as if was preaching to rocks who are only moved by earthquakes. Trouble is that no one can predict when another earthquake will strike though. One of the chapters is actually called Martial Law, which tries to explain that Martial Law is not actually a Law. This is logic at an infantile level, which shows what Bhutto was up against. Bhutto should have realised that his beloved Pakistani people only react to orations and personal gains to themselves and their immediate family. Ideological and principles can only go that far.
Zia was appointed by Bhutto as chairman of a committee to investigate the first attempt by the army in 1973 against him. It is ironic that whatever lessons Zia learnt he was successfully able to turn them around in his own orchestrated coup in 1977.
Reading Bhutto's rebuttal to Zia's white paper, I could feel argumentation of a skills lawyer setting out his own case while sitting in a death cell. He rants and races occasionally but that has to be attributed to some of the points raised in the Junta's White paper I guess. Bhutto has made a fantastic case against his allegations but I could not help wonder why let himself into this dire state to start with? Bhutto was supposed to be the master politician to start with, he knew well how power worked in Pakistan. After all he was himself a chief marital law administrator himself, albeit a civilian one. He should have remained calm and trusted his people to deliver instead of aping his uniformed predecessors in letter and voice. His answer to the White paper makes depressing reading as somehow he knew that his game was up. His only hope seems to be the USA and it's Arab cronies who were not able to save him in the end. I think USA had chosen to make an example of him for all of his earlier transgressions. Maybe he opened up too many frontiers at the same time?
The way power shifts from one to another at the top (in Pakistan) has always managed to be a great mystery for me. It's almost like a sixth sense, lost when constrained by following law. People just seem to know when halo shifts from one person to another in the land of the pure. How did Ayub know when to topple Iskander Mirza for instance? How did Yehya take over from Ayub? And finally how was Bhutto able to drive into Yehya's presidency only to drive out with the presidents flag flying on his car instead? This is a fascinating area of study examples of which can only be found in history books. What goes around comes around, and Bhutto should have realised that the same mysterious spectre of power grab would come and hound him one day as well. In other words he should have done a Zardari. For Zardari has to be given greater credit for finding a way to relinquish power peacefully, on time, at the right moment to the next government, which is an unprecedented event in the whole history of the country. Thus Zardari stays untouched and unmolested siting contently in his villas and drinking fine wine.
In Bhutto's rebuttal, he makes very convincing and points out many inconsistencies in the Junta's white paper over and over again but it all comes down to naught. It felt as if was preaching to rocks who are only moved by earthquakes. Trouble is that no one can predict when another earthquake will strike though. One of the chapters is actually called Martial Law, which tries to explain that Martial Law is not actually a Law. This is logic at an infantile level, which shows what Bhutto was up against. Bhutto should have realised that his beloved Pakistani people only react to orations and personal gains to themselves and their immediate family. Ideological and principles can only go that far.
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